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Conventional wisdom suggests that the uncertainty of uninformed noise-traders’ sentiment deters rational
traders’ arbitrage activities. However, nowadays, social media have made the public sentiment highly predictable,
whereas the CAPM-motivated beta-return relation still does not hold in practice. This study advances an argument
that the sentiment can also be brought about by rational, sophisticated investors’ use of psychological insight;
resultantly, the arbitrage activities are demotivated by their own sentiment, rather than deterred by noise-traders’
sentiment risk. The proposed expectile CAPM provides a parsimonious way to account for this claim, and leads to
a sentiment-based functional form of pricing kernel.1. Introduction
Noise traders are uninformed, irrational and have erroneous sto-
chastic beliefs. When rational arbitrageurs have large exposure to the
uncertainty of noise trader’s sentiment (also known as uninformed noise
traders’ sentiment risk or noise traders’ risk), their arbitrage activities
can be deterred. Therefore, noise traders’ sentiment will be priced as a
risk factor. However, nowadays, social media, such as Facebook, Twitter
and Pinterestare, are representing public sentiment. Can noise traders
learn?
When a message of interest is posted on social networks or micro-
blogging platforms, its informational content, together with the associ-
ated opinions of its readers, can rapidly spread. Information of valuable
financial interest, thus, hits the markets, giving the opportunity for un-
informed traders to investigate and adopt market sentiment. Although
social media cannot remove the randomness associated with noise
traders’ beliefs completely, market sentiment has been highly predict-
able. The existing approaches to extracting sentiment from social media
can be, but are not limited to, lexicon based, machine learning based, or
their combination. Furthermore, the evolution of a market structure
constructed from stock market prices is often observed to reconcile with
Twitter sentiment signals. Why is it, then, that the CAPM-motivatedm Greene, Bing Han, and Chu Z
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xpectile CAPM, Economic Mopositive relation between beta and returns still does not hold in practice?
This study provides new perspectives: sentiment can also be brought
about by rational, sophisticated investors’ use of psychological insight;
then the arbitrage activities can be demotivated by their own sentiment,
rather than deterred by noise-traders’ sentiment risk. Thus, the predict-
ability of the market sentiment does not prevent the sentiment from
being a pricing factor. What’s more, models based on noise-traders’
sentiment risk suggest that policy makers prompt educating “naïve” in-
vestors about their behavioral biases and thus preclude them from
trading on meaningless signals. Based on the theory developed in this
paper, however, this action might not enhance the efficiency of equity
market prices effectively, because sentiment is modeled as brought about
by rational, sophisticated investors.
This study sheds light on this argument by proposing a sentiment-
based extension of Merton (1969, 1971, 1973)’s optimality and equi-
librium theories. In particular, we define sentiment portfolio optimiza-
tion and show its equivalence with Merton (1971)’s portfolio
optimization under the subjective (distorted) measure. This equivalence
leads to the expectile CAPM and a new functional form of pricing kernel.
In their seminal work, Fama and French (1992) documented that the
CAPM-motivated positive relation between beta and returns does not
hold in practice. They consider and overrule two explanations for thishang for helpful discussions and thank participants of European Financial Man-
A) Annual Meeting. We acknowledge the financial support from the National
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W. Hu, Z. Zheng Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxfinding: 1) that beta is measured noisily, and 2) other variables that do
explain returns are correlated with “true” betas. The expectile CAPM
provides a theoretical basis for the hypotheses, by claiming that senti-
ment affects both the quantity of risk and the market price of risk.
This two-fold effect is of immense importance, as excessive pessi-
mism/optimism and ambiguity aversion/overconfidence form two
different layers of sentiment. On the one hand, models of ambiguity
aversion based on multiple-priors preferences (Chen and Epstein, 2002)
can be interpreted in terms of pessimism, but ambiguity can enter into
the market price of risks (uncertainty) only. On the other hand, in models
of overconfidence, i.e., the underestimation of volatility, only the quan-
tity of risks can be affected. However, empirical estimates of optimism
and overconfidence tend to comove over time. The expectile-based
framework established in this study provides a parsimonious way to
account for this finding.
This study also bridges a gap in the sense that most existing empirical
studies focus on the ability of sentiment to explain the time-series of the
cross-section (as a contrarian predictor), rather than its role as a pricing
factor. However, the proposed expectile CAPM introduces a linkage be-
tween systematic (idiosyncratic) risk and comonotonic (non-comono-
tonic) risk,1 which are equivalent to each other whenmarket sentiment is
absent. This linkage leads to a novel risk channel reproducing the cross-
sectional momentum. Specifically, the non-comonotonic risk could
constitute a large proportion of the systematic risk. While the winner
portfolio has a low comonotonic risk, it has a high non-comonotonic risk.
The latter could numerically overweigh the former in determining the
systematic risk. It follows that the rankings of the systematic risk inherent
in stocks could be substantially altered when market sentiment is
incorporated. That explains Yu and Yuan (2011)’s empirical findings that
there is a strong positive return-risk trade-off when sentiment is low, but
little, if any, relationship when sentiment is high.
The concept of rational, sophisticated investors’ sentiment is moti-
vated by two psychological observations. The first one is related to uni-
variate decision making. “Is the glass half empty or half full?” indicates
rhetorically that pessimism or optimism is a disposition, and it could be
unrelated to inexperience, naivety, ignorance, or poor understanding. It
is formed from deep perception cues, such as “thinking the worst, leads to
the best”. Nofsinger (2017) suggests this could be affected by, e.g., ge-
netics, emotion, pride, regret, social interaction or familiarity. However,
getting to the bottom of the “biology of investment” is beyond the scope
of this research.
Another psychological observation, stated as an aphorism, indicates
the importance of sentiment in framing multivariate decisions: “a pessi-
mistic father of two sons, who are an umbrella seller and a fisherman,
worries all the time, no matter whether tomorrow is sunny or rainy”;
however, a risk-averse father thinks that his family is immune from
weather risks. Although drawing little attention in the literature, this
psychological disposition sheds light on the critical points distinguishing
the sentiment-driven and the rational approaches to decision making: 1)
sentiment-driven traders reduce the dimensions of the problem first,
maximally, then evaluate the outcome of each low-dimensional sub-
problem with their distorted priors, and then aggregate the results; 2) for
each sub-problem, traders apply their sentiment to the corresponding
marginal prior only and, hence, a negative correlation does not neces-
sarily diversify the risk.
In this paper, we first assume a representative agent model, and then
study the aggregation of the heterogeneities of sentiment, CARA risk
aversion, and initial wealth. We postulate that the agent asymmetrically
weights the probability of the exceedances beyond the expectile and of
the rest. Based on that distortion, we define the expectile of the original
undistorted prior and the value of the scoring function at the expectile,1 Comonotonic risk refers the perfect positive dependence between the com-
ponents of a random vector. Non-comonotonic risk refers the orthogonal
component to the comonotonic one.
2
concurrently, as a reward-risk measure pair for a univariate. We then
conceptually extend the expectile into the multivariate with/without
information reduction and, to distinguish them, we give the names,
photographic and holographic expectile, respectively, to indicate the intu-
ition that holography takes single holograms from different viewpoints to
reduce the dimensions, while photography reproduces a rudimentary
image of the full dimension. We employ intuition as a metaphor for
sentiment trading.
2. Literature review
The whole literature of sentiment based on noise trading is motivated
by Black (1986), and there is investor-level evidence supporting this
sentiment risk channel. For instance, Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) shows
that inexperienced investors had the most optimistic beliefs during the
tech stock boom (a period of general optimism); Puri and Robinson
(2007) find that individuals with optimistic beliefs are more likely to
invest in individual stocks.
DeLong et al. (1990), Barberies et al. (1998) and Kogan et al. (2006)
detected uninformed traders’ trading noise, and documented the stylized
fact that noise traders’ risk can deter rational arbitrageurs’ arbitrage
activities. In Dumas et al. (2009)’s model, the resultant excess movement
of stock return arising from the vagaries of the overconfident population
is regarded a “sentiment” factor. Barone-Adesi et al. (2014) distinguished
optimism and overconfidence, and documented their comovement. Lee
et al. (1991); Pontiff (1996); Kumar and Lee (2006); Baker and Wurgler
(2006, 2007); Antoniou et al. (2015) proposed that noise traders’ senti-
ment should be priced as a risk factor. Although the sentiment risk factor
partially alleviate the pricing anomalies, Brown and Cliff (2005) and
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) still observed time-series variation of
the pricing error with sentiment. That indicates some predictive infor-
mation that is not completely captured by sentiment as a pricing factor.
Meanwhile, the advancement in Twitter sentiment analysis, such as
Kolchyna et al. (2016a, 2016b), Barbosa and Feng (2010), Kouloumpis
et al. (2011), confirmed the predictability of market sentiment. Tetlock
(2007), using Wall street Journal as example, studied the role of rela-
tively traditional media in giving content to market sentiment. Thus,
those studies challenged noise-trader sentiment risk Hypothesis.
Accordingly, we proposed a hypothesis of sophisticated traders’ senti-
ment, using of their psychological insight.
The following empirical studies provided sentiment explanations on
why the CAPM does not hold: Barberies et al. (1998), Kogan et al. (2006),
Antoniou et al. (2015). They all focused on noise traders’ rather than
sophisticated traders’ sentiment. The other legitimate reasons which are
not sentiment-based (hence can be treated as controls), have been
explored by Merton (1987), Black (1972), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014),
Cohen et al. (2005), Hong and Sraer (2016), Kumar (2009), Bali et al.
(2011), Campbell et al. (2018), Baker et al. (2011), Buffa et al. (2014).
The following empirical study focused on the ability of sentiment as a
contrarian predictor rather than a pricing factor. Brown and Cliff (2004)
find little predictive power using their sentiment measures, and Lemmon
and Portniaguina (2006) find stronger evidence of sentiment as a
contrarian predictor of small stocks and low institutional ownership
stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2006) find robust predictability of the
time-series of the cross-section using an index based on six proxies of
investors’ propensity to invest in stocks. In particular, they observe that
sentiment has relatively stronger effects on stocks whose valuations are
highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 reviews the existing key
concepts of the expectile, and provides a new Definition - holographic
expectile for multivariate. Section 4 formulates the expectile-based
sentiment asset pricing framework. Section 5 discusses applications
and policy implementations. Section 6 concludes.
2 E.g., without loss of generality, we illustrate the above point by assuming a
correlated standard normal vector ðX;YÞ> with correlation ρ, and hðX;YÞ ¼ Xþ
XY . Then the holographic expectile is calculated as: Eθ ½hðX; YÞ  Eθ ½X þ
Eθ ½XY  ¼ E½πXðθÞX þ 12 E½ðπX ðθÞρX2 þ πX ðθÞπZX ðθÞsignðρÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 ρ2
p
ZXXÞ þ
1
2 E½ðπY ðθÞρY2 þ πY ðθÞπZY ðθÞsignðρÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 ρ2
p
ZYYÞ ¼ Φþ ρΨþ
signðρÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 ρ2
p
Φ2, where Φ  E½πX ðθÞX, and Ψ  E½πXðθÞX2, ZX and ZY are
standard normal with ρZX ; X ¼ 0 and ρZY ; Y ¼ 0.
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Newey and Powell (1987) first introduced the expectile. The two
equivalent definitions are listed below (also see Schnabel and Eilers,
2009):
Definition 1. If EjXj < ∞ exists, for given θ 2 ½0;1, the expectile EθðXÞ
is defined as
EθðXÞ  argmin
q
S θðX; qÞ; (1)
where the scoring function S θðX; qÞ is
S θðX; qÞ  ð1 θÞ
Z q
∞
ðX  qÞ2dFðXÞ þ θ
Z ∞
q
ðX  qÞ2dFðXÞ; (2)
and FðXÞ is the cumulative distribution function of random variable X.
Definition 2. . If jXj < ∞, for given θ 2 ½0;1, the expectile EθðXÞ is
defined as the unique solution of the implicit equation for q:
q¼ð1 θÞ
R q
∞ XdFðXÞ þ θ
R∞
q XdFðXÞ
ð1 θÞFðqÞ þ θ½1 FðqÞ : (3)
We denote EθðXÞ  E½πXðθÞX, where πXðθÞ  ð1θÞ1fX<Eθ ðXÞgþθ1fX>Eθ ðXÞgð1θÞFðqÞþθ½1FðqÞ .
Intuitively, we interpret the expectile as a weighted average equaling
the division point, to the left and right side of which, the agent assigns
weights ð1θÞ and θ respectively, and then scales the weighted density
into a probability one. We define the asymmetric weighting factor θ as a
sentiment measure.
For example, if X represents the return on investment, and the agent is
pessimistic, then she overweighs the probability of the bad state [i.e.,
ð1  θÞ > 50%] and underweights the probability of the good state (i.e.,
θ < 50%); the agent does the opposite when holding an optimistic view.
We then conceptually extend the expectile into a multivariate. The
first approach in this study is to reduce the dimensions of the probability
distribution, i.e., for any measureable function hð ; Þ, we define Z 
hðX1;X2;…;XdÞ, then according to Definition 2, Eθ½Z  E½πZðθÞZ. We call
it the photographic expectile of hðX1;X2;…;XdÞ.
The second approach is to define a holographic expectile Eθ½hðX1;X2;…
;XdÞ by constructing an asymmetrically-weighted joint distribution Pθ.
As the name implies, a photographic expectile is a two-dimensional rep-
resentation of ðZ→ Eθ½ZÞ, which can only reproduce a rudimentary
image of ððX1; X2;…; XdÞ→ Eθ½hðX1; X2;…; XdÞÞ; while the holographic
expectile displays a full multi-dimensional image and adds greater depth
to the perception cues that were presented in the agent’s original prior.
Many recent attempts e.g., Herrmann et al. (2018) and Maume-De-
schamps et al. (2017) have been made on the extension: however, it
remains an open question. Incorporating the dependence in a consistent
way, and extending the asymmetric weighting scheme into a multivar-
iate, present difficulties.
Herrmann et al. (2018) defined a Geometric expectile vector q of a
random vector X as the minimizers of the expected loss based on Λθ, i.e.,
Eθ½X ¼ argmin
q2Rd
E½ΛθðX  qÞ, where Λθ : R d → ½0;∞Þ; k t k7! Λθðk t kÞ ¼
1
2t2ðt2 þ 2θ  1; tÞ, θ is the asymmetric weighting vector, and k  k2 is
Euclidean norm. However, the expectile calculated based on themarginal
distribution from a distorted d-dimensional joint distribution is not
consistent with the resultant expectile based on the one dimensional
distorted marginal distribution.
Maume-Deschamps et al. (2017) incorporated the dependence
structure of X, and defined the multivariate expectiles as Eθ½X ¼
argmin
q2Rd
E½θðX  qÞ>þΣðX  qÞþ þ ð1  θÞðX  qÞ>ΣðX  qÞ, where
ðtÞþ ¼ ððt1Þþ;…; ðtdÞþÞ>, and ðtiÞþ represents the positive part of ti;3
ðtÞ ¼ ððt1Þ;…; ðtdÞÞ>, and ðtiÞ represents the negative part of ti; Σ is
the covariance matrix. The problem inherent in Herrmann et al. (2018)’s
Definition still exists. What’s more, Maume-Deschamps et al. (2017)’s
definition gives zero weight upon the values of variables that are not
consistently positive or negative, e.g., ððt1Þþ; ðt1Þ; ðt1Þþ…; ðtdÞÞ>. Pos-
itive and negative parts of each random variable segment the space into
2d subsets. Maume-Deschamps et al. (2017)’s definition considered only
two of them, and neglected all the rest.
Then, how to define the multivariate expectile? As our purpose is to
study how sentiments affect investors’ investment decisions, the exten-
sion of the expectile should be able to reflect the “A father of two sons”
phenomenon. First, a sentiment-driven agent will reduce the dimension
of the problem maximally, evaluate the outcome of each low-
dimensional sub-problem with her distorted prior, and then aggregate
the results; hence, a negative correlation does not necessarily diversify
the risk in sentiment decision making. Second, for each sub-problem, the
agent applies her sentiment on the corresponding marginal prior only.
The name: holographic expectile; shows the intuition that holography
takes single holograms from different viewpoints to reduce the dimen-
sion, while photography reproduces a rudimentary image of the full
dimension. We employ the intuition as a metaphor for sentiment trading,
and start by defining the multivariate expectile for an independent
random vector X.
Definition 3. The holographic expectile of measurable function: hðX1;X2;
…;XdÞ, where Xi are independent, is
Eθ½hðX1;X2;…;XdÞ  E
h
hðX1;X2;…;XdÞ
Yd
i¼1πXi ðθÞ
i
(4)
For convenience, we consider only joint normally distributed random
variables henceforth. Such restriction is sensible for two reasons. First, it
is quite a common assumption that stock price follows geometric Brow-
nian motion. Second, any nonlinear factor model can be turned into a
linear one in discrete time by assuming normal returns (See Cochrane,
2010; page 154). We also postulate that for any sub-problem where the
dimension has been reduced, if it is still multi-dimensional with a
non-diagonal covariance matrix, the agent will orthogonalize the random
variables using the Cholesky decomposition procedure with all possible
permutations, apply Definition 3 for each permutation, and then take the
average.2
In our context, the expectile, as a reward measure, is holographic ad-
ditive by Definition and photographic subadditive (superadditive), i.e.,
EθðZÞ < EθðXÞ þ EθðYÞ for 50% < θ < 1 and EθðZÞ > EθðXÞ þ EθðYÞ for
0 < θ < 50%, where Z ¼ Xþ Y .
Holographic additivity confirms the classical law of one price, i.e., the
same portfolio must give the same price with complete information, see
Cochrane (2010). Photographic subadditivity and superadditivity extend the
Law of one price with information asymmetry. The economic interpreta-
tion is that when market pessimism or optimism prevails, information
asymmetry leads to different subjective prices for this portfolio. When
trading with a counterparty that has only a prior of portfolio return, the
party who has information superiority, i.e., having a prior of the joint
distribution of individual security returns, could buy individual assets,
repackage them and sell the portfolio for a higher price than it costs to
assemble it, if market pessimism prevails. Otherwise, they could buy a
portfolio and sell its contents, if market optimistic prevails. The
W. Hu, Z. Zheng Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxinstantaneous profits earned by doing so reward the party, who has in-
formation superiority, for releasing information to the market.
Expectile has been widely accepted as a risk measure in describing the
tail behavior of financial positions. For the first time in the literature, this
research employs it as a reward measure to represent an agent’s distorted
prior, for the following reasons:
First, as a risk measure, the expectile reflects diversification benefits
via its subadditivity, but allows diversification on comonotonic risks due
to its commonotonic non-additivity (see Ziegel, 2016). That contradicts
intuition. In our context, as a reward measure, the expectile is defined in
such a way that it is holographic additive, i.e., it is additive when an agent
has a prior of the joint distribution of random variables. Meanwhile the
expectile is photographic subadditive (superadditive) when the optimistic
(pessimistic) agent has a prior of the distribution of the summed values
only. The holographic additivity confirms the classical Law of One Price
with complete information. When information asymmetry exits, the
subadditivity and superadditivity rewards the party with information su-
periority for providing additional information to the market, and that
admits appealing economic interpretations.
Second, the scoring function at the expectile, as a risk measure, then
satisfies subadditivity and commonotonic additivity, which are the required
risk-measure properties. What’s more, the expectile satisfies other
Coherence properties, i.e., positive homogeneity, monotonicity, and trans-
lation invariance, which are the axioms that any reward measure used for
performance comparison, insurance, management and regulation should
satisfy.3
Third, the expectile is elicitable and law-invariant, where elicitability
enables the verifiability of the estimation through back-testing, as well as
the comparability of different estimating-procedures under the same
measure; and where law-invariance, a desired property for a measure
when the set of priors is a singleton, ensures that the measure can be
completely determined in terms of a probability distribution.4
4. Expectile asset pricing
In this section, we introduce a sentiment portfolio optimization
problem and derive an expectile CAPM to incorporate market sentiment.
4.1. Model setting
In this subsection, we assume a representative agent model. In the
market, there is a traded bond whose price S0ðtÞ appreciates at a risk-free
rate of interest r, thus, evolving according to the differential equation:
dS0ðtÞ¼ rS0ðtÞdt; S0ð0Þ¼ 1 (5)
Uncertainty in the market is driven by a d-dimensional standard
Brownian motion WðtÞ ¼ ðW1ðtÞ; …; WdðtÞÞ> in Rd, defined on a
complete probability space ðΩ;F ;PÞ with a d d correlation matrix ρ 
ðρijÞ, and we denote by fF tg the P-augmentation of the natural filtration
F Wt ¼ σðWðsÞ; 0 s tÞ, with time span ½0;T for some finite T > 0.
Primary asset prices SiðtÞ; i ¼ 1;…; d follow the dynamics of
dSiðtÞ¼ SiðtÞ½bidtþ σidWiðtÞ; Sið0Þ¼ si; i¼ 1; 2;…; d (6)
Here σ ≜ ðσiÞ is a d 1 volatility vector, and b ≜ ðbiÞ; is a d 1 drift
rate vector. We assume that: r, b, σ and ρ are all constant.
Let xt 2 ð0;∞Þ be the initial agent’s wealth at t ¼ 0, or the realized
agent’s wealth at t > 0. The total wealth XðÞ  Xxt ; ϖðÞ follows the
dynamic,3 See Emmer et al. (2015) for the Definition formulas of subadditivity, com-
monotonic additivity, positive homogeneity, monotonicity, and translation invariance.
4 See Ziegel (2016) for the Definition formulas of elicitability and
law-invariance.
4
dXðsÞ¼
Xd
ϖiðsÞXðsÞfbidsþ σidWiðsÞg
i¼1
þ
n
1
Xd
i¼1
ϖiðsÞ
o
XðsÞrds cðsÞds;8s t; and XðtÞ  xt;
(7)
where ðϖ; cÞ represents the portfolio/consumption process pair.
Let Ui : ð0;∞Þ → R; i ¼ 1;2, be strictly increasing, strictly concave,
utility functions of class C1, satisfying,
dU’ið0þÞ≜ limx↓0U
’
iðxÞ¼∞; U’ið∞Þ≜ limx→∞U
’
iðxÞ¼ 0 (8)
Then the sentiment portfolio optimization, with initial state XðtÞ  xt : 8
t 2 ½0;T is
Jðxt; tÞ ≜ esssup
ðϖ;cÞ2A ’0ðxt ;t; TÞ
Eθ
 Z T
t
U1½cðsÞ; sdsþU2ðXxt ; ϖ;cðTÞÞjF t

; (9)
with boundary condition
JðXðTÞ;TÞ ≜ U2ðXðTÞÞ; (10)
We postulate that even though the agent is sentiment driven, she is
rational in maximally utilizing the information she has, hence, sentiment
distorts the prior of the joint distribution of asset returns rather than the
univariate distribution of portfolio return; also, the agent converts a high-
dimensional risk source into a linear combination of univariate and in-
dependent bivariate risk sources through deriving an expectile Hamil-
ton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) of Eq (9). It is important to know that, the
agent’s choice of approach and the extent to which she reduces dimen-
sion, determines the resultant value of expectile. That implies dimen-
sionality reduction is part of the expectile-based modelling.
This optimization is to obtain the indirect utility Jðxt ; tÞ by choosing
ðϖ; cÞ over the class A ’0ðxt ; t; TÞ. Following the setting of Cvitanic and
Karatzas (1992), it is a set of ðϖ; cÞ 2 A 0ðxt ; t; TÞ that satisfy
E
 Z T
t
U1 ½cðsÞ; sdsþU2 ðXxt ; ϖ;cðTÞÞjF t

< ∞; (11)
where A 0ðxt ; t;TÞ is a set of admissible pairs ensuring that, for the initial
capital, xt 2 ð0; ∞Þ, Xxt ; ϖ;cðsÞ  0, 8t  s  T, holds almost surely. We
postulate that Jðxt ; tÞ is in C2;1ðR þ; ½0;TÞ.4.2. Expectile CAPM
In this subsection, we solve sentiment portfolio optimization and obtain
Proposition 1, which provides insight into many aspects of asset pricing,
such as optimal wealth allocation and consumption, portfolio rebalanc-
ing frequency and risk decomposition.
Proposition 1. Given market sentiment θ such that the d d matrix
Vθ  ðρijσiσj þsignðρijÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 ðρijÞ2
q
σiσjΦ2Þ is positive semi-definite
(p.s.d.), the optimal portfolio/consumption process pair ðϖ*; c*Þ solving
the sentiment portfolio optimization problem is
ϖ*ðtÞ¼  JXðXðtÞ; tÞ
XðtÞJX;XðXðtÞ; tÞφ
θ; (12)
and
c*ðtÞ¼ I1ðt; JXðXðtÞ; tÞÞ; (13)
where φθ  V1θ fbþΦ
ffiffiffi
n
p
σr1g is a vector of the market price of risk
with rebalancing frequency n, I1ðt; Þ is the inverse of the function U’1ðt;
Þ, and Φ  Eθ½ε, with εeN ð0; 1Þ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
W. Hu, Z. Zheng Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxTheorem 1. (Expectile CAPM) Suppose the usual assumptions for CAPM
apply, except that the agent is driven by sentiment as well rather than
purely by rationality, then the sentiment portfolio optimization implies
that for any security i ¼ 1;2;…; d,
bi þΦ
ffiffiffi
n
p
σi  r¼ βθ

bMðtÞþΦ
ffiffiffi
n
p ½ϕ*ðtÞ>σ r (14)
where ϕ*ðtÞ ¼ ϖ*ðtÞPd
i¼1ϖ
*
i ðtÞ
; bMðtÞ ¼
Pd
i¼1
ϕ*i ðtÞbi;
σiMðtÞ 
Pd
j¼1
ρijðtÞσiðtÞσjðtÞϕ*j ðtÞ σMMðtÞ 
Pd
i¼1
ϕ*i ðtÞσiMðtÞ; ~σiMðtÞ 
Pd
j¼1
sign½ρijðtÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 ðρijðtÞÞ2
q
σiðtÞσjðtÞϕ*j ðtÞ; ~σMMðtÞ 
Pd
i¼1
ϕ*i ðtÞ~σiMðtÞ; βθ 
σiM ðtÞþ~σiM ðtÞΦ2
σMM ðtÞðtÞþ~σMM ðtÞΦ2
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 suggests that market sentiment will distort the attitude of
the agent towards individual securities, as well as the overall financial
market, in terms of risk and reward. As sentiment deviating from neutral,
expectile CAPM can still be represented as a single factor model; how-
ever, the risk premiums are adjusted by the market sentiment; the sys-
tematic risk being priced for the market is the weighted sum of the
comonotonic risk σMMðtÞ and the non-comonotonic risk ~σMMðtÞ, where
the weights are completely determined by the market sentiment. With
the same set of weights, the systematic risk for any security i is the
weighted sum of the comonotonic risk σiMðtÞ and the non-comonotonic
risk ~σiMðtÞ. Subsection 4.2 will further demonstrate how the expectile
CAPM contributes to a potential explanation of the momentum and long-
term reversals.
Remark 1. Eq (12) indicates that the agent’s sentiment will change
the optimal portfolio processϖ*ðtÞ directly and, correspondingly, change
the total wealth XðÞ of the next period through portfolio rebalancing
over time. Although the agent’s sentiment θ does not enter into the
formulation of optimal consumption process c*ðtÞ explicitly, Eq (13)
suggests that c*ðtÞ is usually a function of total wealth XðtÞ at that time,
through which sentiment may affect the optimal consumption process
indirectly.
Remark 2. Eq (12) and Eq (14) suggest that the adjustments to both
the portfolio process and the risk premium caused by sentiment are
proportional to the square root of the rebalancing frequency, which also
influences the risks (systematic, comonotonic, non-comonotonic) indi-
rectly through changing the composition of the optimal market portfolio.
Eq (14) implies that it is rational for the agent to trade more (less) often if
market sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic). This is an extension of the
Merton (1973) paper, which claimed that the equilibrium is a function of
the trading intervals chosen owing to the market structural change, e.g., a
term structure will illustrate the point. In our context, a static market
structure (e.g., a flat rate) with a non-neutral constant market sentiment
could also require an optimal holding period before the agent revises her
portfolio.
Remark 3. The variance-covariance matrix describes how data is
spread across the feature space. The largest eigenvalue is the magnitude
of the vector that points into the direction with the largest spread. The
second largest eigenvalue is the magnitude of the vector orthogonal to
the largest eigenvector, and points in the direction of the second largest
spread, and so on. The intuitive geometric interpretation of the required
condition in Proposition 1, that θ ensures Vθ p.s.d., is that although the
sentiment will reshape agent’s view of the data distribution, she holds the
basic reason for the non-negative magnitudes of the reshaped data
spreads.
Remark 4. See Appendix A, the proof of Proposition 1 indicates that
the sentiment portfolio optimization in the original market (denoted as M )
is equivalent to the classical portfolio optimization in an auxiliary market
(denoted as M θ), where the returns on primary assets follow geometric5
Brownian motion with drift rate vector, ~b ¼ bþ Φ ffiffiffinp σ, and variance-
covariance matrix Vθ. Such equivalence provides a way of translating a
sentiment portfolio optimization into a classical portfolio optimization. Then,
the existing asset pricing knowledge can be employed directly.
Definition 4. The classical portfolio optimization problem in auxiliary
market M θ is
Jðxt; tÞ ≜ esssup
ðϖ;cÞ2A ’0ðxt ;t; TÞ
~E
 Z T
t
U1½cðsÞ; sdsþU2ðXxt ; ϖ;cðTÞÞjF t

(15)
where ~Eð Þ represents the expectation under the probability measure in
the auxiliary market M θ, where the primary assets Sθi ; i ¼ 1;…; d,
follow the dynamics of
dSθi ðtÞ¼ Sθi ðtÞ
h
~bidtþ
Xd
j¼1
ηijd bWiðtÞi; Sθi ð0Þ¼ si; i¼ 1; 2;…; d (16)
where d dmatrix η is the lower triangular Cholesky factorization of Vθ,
and dcW ðtÞ ¼ η1diagðσÞdWðtÞ, and diagðσÞ is the diagonal matrix with
the elements of vector σ as its diagonal entries.
So far, we assume there is only one representative agent. First, does
there exist a representative investor if all investors have the same
sentiment? Second, in practice, individual heterogeneity may drive
differing sentiment, then how to aggregate them? As the discussion does
not change the results henceforth, we discuss the aggregation in Ap-
pendix C.4.3. A new pricing kernel
Araujo et al. (2012) developed an Arrow–Debreu ambiguous state
price of single-period securities markets with finitely many states. In this
subsection, we create an extended asset pricing framework by identifying
a new pricing kernel incorporating agent’s sentiment, assuming contin-
uous time and uncountable many states.
Theorem 2. Given a market sentiment θ such that the d d matrix Vθ is
p.s.d., the fair price of a contingent claim with terminal payoff BðTÞ is uniquely
determined by:
p pðxt; t;TÞ¼
~E

U’2

Xxt ; ϖ
	 ; c	 ðTÞBðTÞjF t
U’1½t; c	ðtÞ
; (17)
where ~E½ represents the expectation under the probability measure in
auxiliary market M θ.
Proof Directly from Remark 4 and Theorem 7.2 in Karatzas and Kou
(1996).
Theorem 3. Given a market sentiment θ such that the d dmatrix Vθ is
p.s.d., the fair price of a contingent claim with terminal payoff BðTÞ is
uniquely determined by:
p pðxt; t;TÞ¼ ~E

HðTÞBðTÞ
HðtÞ
				F t; (18)
where ~E½jF t  represents the conditional expectation under the proba-
bility measure in the auxiliary market M θ, where in auxiliary market M θ
is HðtÞ ¼ expf rtgexp


 R t0 ϑθ  dcW ðsÞ  12 R t0 ϑ2θds, for 0  s  t,
where ϑθ ¼ η1½~b  r1.
ProofDirectly from Remark 4 and Theorem 7.4 in Karatzas and Kou
(1996).
Theorem 3 suggests that market sentiment affects both the agent’s
prior of the payoff being priced and the pricing kernel: the one in-
corporates and summarizes the prior of all primary assets.
W. Hu, Z. Zheng Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxIf we make a further assumption that the agent consumes all the
terminal wealth at time T, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 indicate a trans-
formation between the new asset pricing kernel considering sentiment,
and the consumption growth. From there, we will see in Subsection 4.3
how the equity premium puzzle arises.
4.4. Implementations for empirical literature
Stambaugh et al. (2012) documented the role of sentiment empiri-
cally in a broad set of anomalies in cross-sectional stock returns. In this
section, we apply expectile asset pricing framework to examine, theo-
retically, its implication for the pricing kernel puzzle, the relationship
between momentum-induced profits and sentiment, and propose a model
illustrating how sentiment inflates the equity premium puzzle. The pur-
pose of this study is not resolving anomalies, as being exhaustive in
examining all of the potential explanations and claiming expectile
framework is empirically reconcilable with the anomalies is beyond the
scope of this theoretical paper. We shed light on a novel channel to
invoke further creative empirical research.
4.5. Pricing kernel puzzle
The pricing kernel summarizes all relevant asset pricing information.
It is a change of measure (see Eq (18)), as well as the marginal rate of
substitution (see Eq (17)) i.e., the rate at which the investor is willing to
substitute consumption at a future time for consumption at the current
moment. It is well-known that the classical CAPM can be reformulated as
a linear relationship between the pricing kernel m and the market gross
return RW (see Cochrane, 2010, p 133),
m¼A B RW ; (19)
with
m¼
8>><>>:
A ¼ 1
Rft
þ bEt

RWtþ1

B ¼ Et

RWtþ1
 Rft
Rft VARt

RWtþ1
 (20)
where Rft is the gross risk-free rate and VARtðRWtþ1Þ is the conditional
variance of RWtþ1.
In a normal market, obviously B is positive, hence, the pricing kernel
declines as market return rises. The pricing kernel puzzle refers to the
observation that the pricing kernel might increase in some range of the
market returns (Ait-Sahalia and Lo, 2000; Jackwerth, 2000).
Most extant explanations for this puzzle are based on missing risk
factors (e.g. Chabi-Yo et al., 2008), heterogeneous beliefs (e.g. Shefrin,
2008; Ziegler, 2007; Hens and Reichlin, 2013), statistical and estimation
issues (Siddiqi and Amwar, 2018), as well as utilities, such as
non-concave utilities (Hens and Reichlin, 2013), rank-dependent ex-
pected utilities (Polkovnichenko and Zhao, 2013) and state dependent
utilities (Krishna and Sadowski, 2014), and the behavioral channel has
not been explored.5
We claim that the affine transformation imposed in Remark 4 (from b
to ~b) can generate a non-monotonic pricing kernel. In particular, a simple
way to incorporate sentiment is to consider the classical portfolio opti-
mization in the auxiliary market. In that case, the B in Eq (20) will be
adjusted into
B¼Et

RWtþ1
þΦ ffiffiffinp ½ϕ*ðtÞ>σ  Rft
Rft ½σMMðtÞðtÞ þ ~σMMðtÞΦ2
(21)5 Polkovnichenko and Zhao (2013) might be the only exception.
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Then, depending on the sign of ½ϕ*ðtÞ>σ, as sentiment deviates from
neutral, Φ
ffiffiffi
n
p ½ϕ*ðtÞ>σ can be negative and consequently make B fall into
a negative zone. Hence, the non-monotonicity of the pricing kernel with
respect to the market sentiment can be observed in some range of
sentiment. Then, owing to the strong correlation between sentiment
levels and contemporaneous market returns, as documented in Brown
and Cliff (2004), the non-monotonicity can also be observed in some
range of the market returns. That could be a possible explanation for the
pricing kernel puzzle.
4.6. Momentum and long-term reversal
Cross-sectional momentum, the only anomaly unexplained by the
three-factor model (Fama and French, 1996), was first documented by
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Winners (i.e., stocks with strong past
performance based on 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months)
continue to outperform losers over the next period on a 3- to 12- month
horizon, with betas (also known as the relative systematic risk) for the
winners being even lower than those for the losers, and the effect dissi-
pates after 12 months. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) found
long-term reversals in cross-sectional returns over 2- to 5-year horizons.
Many risk-based explanations for momentums have been proposed,
either theoretically or empirically (Johnson, 2002; Sagi and Seasholes,
2007). The existing empirical literature of momentum is far from
conclusive. For example, momentum strategies are highly volatile and
experience infrequent but severe losses in panic states (Daniel and
Moskowitz, 2016), which challenges existing rational or behavioral ex-
planations. In this subsection, we explain the momentum using the
extended asset pricing framework developed in Section 3.
The expectile CAPM identifies three sources of misspecification
inherent in the classical CAPM: 1) unadjusted risk premium for security,
2) unadjusted market risk premium, and 3) degenerated composition of
systematic risk. We propose the following two alternative channels to
explain the remaining momentum in profits, after controlling the first
misspecification by creating winner and loser portfolios with the same
volatility.
Hypothesis 1. (Market-risk-premium approach) After adjustment for
market sentiment, the systematic risks for the winner and loser portfolios
change in magnitude, but the ranking remains the same. However, the
adjusted market risk premium (by a pessimistic view) becomes negative,
and that makes the portfolio with greater systematic risk become a loser.
Hypothesis 2. (Systematic risk approach) After adjustment for market
sentiment, the market risk premium is still positive. However, the non-
comonotonic risk becomes a large proportion of the systematic risk.
Although the winner portfolio has a low comonotonic risk (usually un-
derstood as the systematic risk in the classical CAPM), it has a high non-
comonotonic risk, which dominates in determining the systematic risk,
while market sentiment is incorporated. That substantially changes the
rankings of the profitability of the stocks.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 provide alternative reasoning for the fact that the
winners are often associated with betas even lower than those of the
losers. In addition, the formation and updating of market sentiment can
be an overcorrecting procedure; a pessimistic or optimistic view will be
identified within a short period and fully corrected over a longer term:
that is consistent with the striking term structure, found in Han and Li
(2017) using China market data, that local sentiment shifts from a
short-termmomentum predictor to a contrarian predictor in the long run.
Those facts, together, resolve momentum and long-term reversal
anomalies.
Many studies report on using idiosyncratic risk to explain the
persistence of momentum and reversal, e.g., Arena et al. (2008), who
found a positive correlation betweenmomentum return and idiosyncratic
volatility, and McLean (2010) reported that the prevalence of reversal is
found only in high idiosyncratic risk stocks, and claimed the reason that
W. Hu, Z. Zheng Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxidiosyncratic risk limits arbitrage in reversal mispricing. We argue that
idiosyncratic risk is defined as risk that can be mitigated through
diversification; hence, by Definition, taking idiosyncratic risks should not
be rewarded by a higher return. Expectile CAPM suggests that the
non-comonotonic risk, which is rewarded as it forms part of the sys-
tematic risk when market sentiment deviates from neutral, might have
been misunderstood as idiosyncratic.
To illustrate the above point, for convenience, we consider the
contribution from security j of security i’s systematic risk by projecting
the total risk of security i on security j (rather than on the market port-
folio), see Fig. 1 below. Summing the projections over j, the systematic
risk is obtained by Definition.
Fig. 1(a) indicates that when market sentiment is neutral, the con-
tributions of systematic risk and comonotonic risk coincide as σij;
Fig. 1(b) shows when market sentiment is optimistic or pessimistic, the
agent’s view will cast with a squint angle, and project on security j,
resulting in a systematic risk contribution σij þ ~σijΦ2, which is a mixture
of comonotonic σij and non-comonotonic ~σij. In that case, the idiosyn-
cratic risk contribution is formulated as: ~σij  σijΦ2, and is still inde-
pendent of the systematic risk contribution. In sum, when market
sentiment is non-neutral, non-comonotonic risk will be priced. However,
the idiosyncratic risk should never be priced.
4.7. Equity premium puzzle
Mehra and Prescott (1985) first documented the equity premium
puzzle as the fact that, to rationalize Post World War II US capital market
and consumption data, themean-variance based portfolio theory requires
an implausibly high degree of risk aversion. We claim that the anomaly
can be inflated by pessimistic market sentiment.
Proposition 2. Given market sentiment θ such that the d d matrix Vθ
is p.s.d., the following inequality holds:
bM þΦ
ffiffiffi
n
p ½ϕ*ðtÞ>σ  r< γσc
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σMMðtÞ þ ~σMMðtÞ
p
; (22)
where γ  c*ðtÞU’’1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞU’1ðt; c*ðtÞÞ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-
aversion.
Proof. See Appendix D.
It is easy to see that a further assumption, i.e., neutral market senti-
ment (θ ¼ 50%), will make Eq (22) degenerate into the classical equity
premium puzzle, formulated as below:Figure 1. Systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk decomposition. (a) Neutral market
50%) or pessimistic (θ < 50%).
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bM  r < γσcσM ; (23)where σMðtÞ is the volatility of market portfolio with σMðtÞ  ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiσMMp .
Proposition 2 suggests that market sentiment could be the reason the
equity premium puzzle is inflated. Fear of the unknown, increases the
systematic risk by introducing non-comonotonic risk additional to the
comonotonic risk. Such pessimistic beliefs also dissipate the market risk
premium and, hence, to keep the same level of Sharpe ratio, a much
greater expected return is required. That explains why the observed
returns on stocks in the second half of the 20th century are much higher
than the returns on government bonds.
The risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989), presented as the inverse of
the equity premium puzzle, questions why government bond returns are
lower than equity returns to a level beyond what a plausible risk aversion
could explain. We claim that, assuming instantaneous risk-free rate r is
non-stochastic, then by the Definition of HðtÞ and by the fact that the
gross risk-free rate: Rf ¼ 1=EθðHðtÞÞ ¼ 1=EðHðtÞÞ, it follows that Rf is not
affected by market sentiment. According to Eq (12), pessimistic senti-
ment will decrease all the elements in portfolio process vector, π*ðtÞ and,
thus, the proportion of the wealth assigned to the risk-free asset will be
increased. That explains why investors seeking out high returns invest
heavily in government bonds, rather than in equities. This is consistent
with the empirical finding in Da et al. (2015), that sentiment, proxied by
the Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index,
predicts mutual fund flows out of equity funds and into bond funds. If the
investors did invest in fewer equities, returns from the equities would
rise, causing the returns for government bonds to fall, and making the
equity premium even greater.
5. Conclusion
This research is driven by the contradiction between the noise-trader
sentiment risk Hypothesis and the high predictability of market senti-
ment owing to the social media nowadays, as well as by the continuing
debates on the pricing kernel puzzle, momentum, long-term reversal, and
the equity premium puzzle. We contribute to a potential explanation for
these debates from the new perspective of sentiment emanating from the
use of psychological insight by rational, sophisticated investors. In
particular, we define sentiment portfolio optimization, and state the
equivalence between sentiment portfolio optimization in the original mar-
ket and classical portfolio optimization in the auxiliary market. This
equivalence leads to the expectile CAPM and two kernel pricing for-
mulas. From there, we propose explanations for the anomalies and puz-
zles stated above.sentiment (θ ¼ 50%); (b) Non-neutral market sentiment, either optimistic (θ >
W. Hu, Z. Zheng Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxThe essence of the impacts of market sentiment lies in its ability to
change the monetary value of information, optimal wealth allocation and
consumption, risk decomposition, portfolio rebalancing frequency, etc.
All in all, it changes both the quantity of risk and the market price of the
risk. The main arguments include: 1) pricing theory extends the classical
Law of One Price in such a way that it is profitable to repackage assets and
sell the portfolio (or to buy a portfolio and sell its content) when market
pessimism (optimism) prevails. The instantaneous profits earned by
doing so, reward the party having information superiority for her infor-
mation release to the market. 2) Optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment en-
courages agents to take a greater (lesser) proportion of risky assets and,
hence, a lesser (greater) proportion of risk-free assets. Such changes
associated with trading activity result in a different total wealth, which,
in turn, affects the agent’s consumption behavior. 3) When the market is
sentiment-neutral, the systematic risk coincides with the comonotonic
risk, and the idiosyncratic risk coincides with the non-comonotonic risk.
Non-comonotonic (comonotonic) risk enters into the systematic (idio-
syncratic) risk formulation in addition to the comonotonic (non-como-
notonic) risk, and increases in proportion6 as the market sentiment
deviates further from neutral to either pessimistic or optimistic. 4)
Idiosyncratic risk is always independent of systematic risk, hence, it is not
priced, regardless of whether or not market sentiment is neutral. 5) The
risk premium increases as market sentiment becomes more optimistic,
and decreases as it becomes more pessimistic, and the change is pro-
portional to the square root of the rebalancing frequency. 6) When
pricing an asset, the market sentiment affects both the agent’s prior of its
payoff and the pricing kernel, which incorporates and summarizes the
prior of all primary assets.
The implementation on explaining the pricing kernel puzzle demon-
strates the empirical relevance of the proposed pricing kernel. The affine
transformation, bridging the original market and the auxiliary market
augmented for adapting sentiment, can generate a non-monotonic pric-
ing kernel.
As a result of conducting this study, we propose two conditions
causing the momentum to persist: 1) a negative market risk premium
caused by very pessimistic sentiment; and 2) a non-comonotonic-risk-
dominated systematic risk that suggests a different ranking of the prof-
itability of stocks. However, if these two conditions are concurrently
satisfied, the momentum can be mitigated.6 It can be a negative proportion and, in that case, “greater” refers to the
magnitude of the proportion.
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This study suggests a possible answer to the equity premium puzzle,
i.e., why the market excess return is high to a level beyond what a
plausible risk aversion could explain. After World War II, on the one
hand, the ‘fear-of-the-unknown’ atmosphere made it impossible for non-
comonotonic risk to be fully diversified, and that prompted investors to
ask for a higher return, commensurate with the greater systematic risk;
on the other hand, the returns on assets were often discounted, because
investors held a pessimistic view of future returns as forecasted using
historical data, especially for highly volatile stocks. Hence, the market-
required returns for risky assets were even greater. Such mispricing
cannot be arbitraged by trading activities seeking high profits. On the
contrary, doing that would exaggerate the puzzle, unless the pessimistic
sentiment were to be corrected over a period of time.
The proposed theoretical results can be tested empirically for future
research. First, given market sentiment as a constant, extending quantile
regression by revising the minimization objective from an asymmetri-
cally weighted mean absolute error to an asymmetrically weighted mean
squared error, enables the development of an expectile regression for
testing the expectile CAPM empirically. By analogy, extending the
Bayesian approach applicable to the quantile regression to make it work
for the expectile regression, enables us to relax the constant market
sentiment assumption, and to use the developed Bayesian approach to
estimate the unknown market unknown parameter, such as market
sentiment and sentiment-adjusted beta, or to filter them out as latent
state variables. That, to some extent, alleviates CAPM’s shortcoming that
it can be tested only with historical data, which against the fact that the
risks and risk premia in CAPM are all ex ante. We can further conduct a
GMM estimation with the expectile CAPM and pricing anomalies, such as
the pricing kernel puzzle, equity premium puzzle, etc., as moment con-
ditions, and determine the level of market sentiment required to mitigate
those anomalies.
The main policy recommendations are stated as follows. Educating
“naïve” investors about their behavioral biases may not enhance the ef-
ficiency of equity market prices effectively, because sentiment can also be
brought about by sophisticated investors’ use of psychological insight.
Policy makers should pursue strategies of influencing investors’ under-
standing of the new efficiency structure, and encouraging them to invest
under the constraints of existing sentiment.Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1.
According to the dynamic programming principle,
Jðxt ; tÞ¼ esssup
ðϖ;cÞ2A ’0ðxt ;t; tþdtÞ
Eθ½JðXðtþ dtÞ; tþ dtÞÞjF t  (A.1)
We apply Taylor expansion to JðXðtþdtÞ; tþdtÞÞ in Eq (A.1) to reduce the dimension and derive HJB
0¼ esssup
ðϖ;cÞ2A ’0ðxt ;t; tþdtÞ
U1½cðtÞ; tdtþ JðXðtÞ; tÞdtþ JXðXðtÞ; tÞEθ

dXjF t þ 12JXXðXðtÞ; tÞE
θ½dXdXjF t

þ OðdtÞ2 (A.2)
We add the expectation operator on Eq (7), and get
Eθ
h
dXðtÞjF t  ¼
nXd
i¼1
ϖiðtÞXðtÞ½bi þ σiEθ½dWiðtÞjF t 
i
þ
h
1
Xd
i¼1
ϖiðtÞ
i
XðtÞr cðtÞ
o
dt (A.3)
and
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h
dXðtÞdXðtÞjF t ¼ ½XðtÞ2
Xd Xd 
ϖiðtÞϖjðtÞσiσj

Eθ

dWiðtÞdWjðtÞ
		F tidt (A.4)
i¼1 j¼1
Taking the derivative of which w.r.t. cðtÞ and ϖðtÞ, we get the following first-order-conditions (FOCs):
U1;c½cðtÞ; t JXðXðtÞ; tÞ¼ 0 (A.5)
and for i ¼ 1;2;…;d,
JXðXðtÞ; tÞ


bi þ Φffiffiffiffi
dt
p σi  r

þJX;XðXðtÞ; tÞXðtÞ
nXd
j¼1

ϖjðtÞρijσiσj

Ψþ
Xd
j¼1
h
ϖjðtÞsignρij ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi1 ρ2ijq σiσjiΦ2o¼ 0 (A.6)
where Φ  Eθ½ε, and ε is a N ð0; 1Þ random variable, and Ψ  Eθ½ε2. Numerical approximation of Ψ indicates Ψ  1, for any value of θ 2 ½0; 1Ψ 
Eθ½ε2 ¼ E½πθðεÞε2E½πθðzÞzz ¼ ε2.
Denoting 1=
ffiffiffiffi
dt
p
as rebalancing frequency n, Eq (A.6) implies that sentiment portfolio optimization in the original market (denoted as M ) is equivalent
to the classical portfolio optimization in an auxiliary market (denoted asM θ), where the returns of primary assets follow geometric Brownianmotion with
drift rate vector, ~b ¼ bþ Φ ffiffiffinp σ, and variance-covariance matrix Vθ.
Rewriting Eq (A.6) as a more compact expression, we then get the optimized portfolio process,
ϖ*ðtÞ¼  JXðXðtÞ; tÞ
XðtÞJX;XðXðtÞ; tÞV
1
θ

bþΦ ffiffiffinp σ r1 (A.7)
where Vθ ¼ ðρijσiσj þ signðρijÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 ρ2ij
q
σiσjΦ2Þ; i; j ¼ 1;2;…;d.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 1.
We denote investor k’s optimized portfolio process, wealth process and indirect utility as ϖ*kðtÞ, XkðtÞ and JkðXðtÞ; tÞ, and sum K homogeneous
investors’ portfolio weights, then we get the aggregated market portfolio process π*MðtÞ,
ϖ*ðtÞ¼
PK
k¼1ϖ
*
kðtÞXkðtÞPK
k¼1XkðtÞ
¼ A
X
V1θ

bþΦ ffiffiffinp σ r1 (A.8)
where
A¼
XK
k¼1
 
 J
k
XðXðtÞ; tÞ
JkX;XðXðtÞ; tÞ
!
; X¼
XK
k¼1
XkðtÞ (A.9)
Then, the expectile excess return vector satisfies the following equation,

bþΦ ffiffiffinp σ r1¼Vθϖ*ðtÞXA (A.10)
Then, for any security, i, we have the expectile CAPM as follows,
bi þΦ
ffiffiffi
n
p
σi  r¼ βθ

bM þΦ
ffiffiffi
n
p ½ϕ*ðtÞ>σ r (A.11)
where βθ  σiM ðtÞþ~σiM ðtÞΦ2
σMM ðtÞþ~σMM ðtÞΦ2
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix C. Heterogeneity and aggregation
In practice, individual heterogeneity may drive differing sentiment. Hong and Stein (2007) stressed that heterogeneous sentiment can extract
different values from new information available to all investors simultaneously. Edelen et al. (2010) stated the difference between the sentiments of
retail and institutional investors. Harris and Raviv (1993) and Karpoff (1986) documented a positive relationship between the sentiment disagreement
and trading volume. Atmaz and Basak (2018) developed a dynamic belief dispersion model, with a continuum of investors differing in beliefs. Banerjee
and Kremer (2010) considered learning patterns of trade from the disagreement in sentiment.
In this subsection, we assume a framework of CARA, which ensure that there exist a representative investor if all investors have the same sentiment
θ. We then assume heterogeneous investors, and aggregate individual heterogeneity to construct a representative agent, whose sentiment (risk aversion,
initial wealth) is the composite of the sentiments (risk aversions, initial wealth) of individual investors.
Assume K investors are holding the same prior, but with different sentiment θk, utilitiesUk1 and U
k
2, initial wealth x
k
t at time t, and price-of-risk vector
φkðtÞ, where9
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ffiffiffi
n
p
σ r1 (A.12) 
We denote investor k’s optimized portfolio process, wealth process and indirect utility as π*kðtÞ, XkðtÞ and JkðXðtÞ;tÞ, where k ¼ 1; 2;…K. We further
assume Uk1 is constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) with an Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion, Ak. Then, the first order condition (FOC) of
the sentiment portfolio optimization implies that
 J
k
XðXðtÞ; tÞ
JkX;XðXðtÞ; tÞ
¼  U
k
1;c½ckðtÞ; t
Uk1;c;c½ckðtÞ; t
¼Ak (A.13)
Substituting Eq (A.13) into ϖ	kðtÞ, and then summing it over all individuals, we get the aggregated market portfolio process as:
ϖ*ðtÞ¼
PK
k¼1ϖ
*
kðtÞXkðtÞPK
k¼1XkðtÞ
¼RðtÞφ (A.14)
where RðtÞ is the reciprocal of the aggregated Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-aversion, and φ is the aggregated market price of risk,
RðtÞ¼
PK
k¼1AkðtÞPK
k¼1XkðtÞ
; φ¼
XK
k¼1
(
φkAkPK
k¼1Ak
)
(A.15)
Definition 4. The representative agent’s sentiment θ is defined as the least bullish or bearish projection of the aggregated sentiment,
θ¼ argminbψ2bΘ jbψ  50%j; (A.16)
where Θ ≜ fψ 2 ½0;1; Vψ is p:s:d:g; bΘ ≜ bψ ; bψ ¼ argmin
ψ2Θ
φ  φψ 2, jj  jj is Euclidian.
Lemma 1. There exists a unique representative agent’s sentiment.
Proof. By Definition Vψ ¼ V1 þ Φ2V2, where V1  ðρijσiσjÞ and V2  ðsignðρijÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 ðρijÞ2
q
σiσjÞ are Hermitian matrices, then according to Garding
(1959), the least eigenvalue of Vψ is a concave function. Then,Θ is a nonempty closed convex set (more specifically, a closed interval). Because φ φbψ is
a continuous function of bψ , then it attains its minimum at some point(s) contained in the interval, namely the set bΘ is nonempty. Then, it is trivial that Eq
(A.16) has a unique solution.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2.
For any contingent claim Bð Þ, we denote the terminal payoff BðTÞ as pT , then we can rewrite Eq (18) as
ptHðtÞ¼ ~E½pTHðTÞjF t (A.17)
Hence, process ptHðtÞ is a martingale in auxiliary market M θ, then we have
0¼ ~E

dðptHðtÞÞ
ptHðtÞ jF t

¼ ~E

dHðtÞ
HðtÞ
				F tþ ~Edptpt jF t

þ ~E

dHðtÞ
HðtÞ
dpt
pt
				F t (A.18)
By the Definition of HðtÞ in Theorem 3,
dHðtÞ
HðtÞ ¼ rdt þ ϑθd
bW ðtÞ (A.19)
In auxiliary market M θ, market portfolio return is
Xd
i¼1
ϕiðtÞdSiðtÞ
SiðtÞ ¼
Xd
i¼1
½ϕiðtÞ~biðtÞdt þ
Xd
j¼1
Xd
i¼1

ϕiðtÞηijðtÞ

d bWjðtÞ (A.20)
Substitute Eq (A.19) and Eq (A.20) into Eq (A.18), and thank Cauchy inequality, we have
~E
Xd
i¼1
ϕiðtÞdSiðtÞ
SiðtÞ jF t

 rdt¼ ~E

 dHðtÞ
HðtÞ
Xd
i¼1
ϕiðtÞdSiðtÞ
SiðtÞ
				F t< dtϑθðtÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiXd
j¼1
Xd
i¼1

ϕiðtÞηij
2vuut ¼ dtϑθðtÞ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiσMMðtÞ þ ~σMMðtÞp (A.21)
According to Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992), by construction, the dynamic of HðtÞ equals Jxðxt ; tÞ, then we have,
dJxðxt ; tÞ¼  rðsÞJxðxt; tÞdt  ϑθðsÞJxðxt ; tÞd bW ðsÞ (A.22)
Apply Itô’s Lemma on Eq (13), we have10
W. Hu, Z. Zheng Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxdJxðxt ; tÞ¼ dU’1ðt; c*ðtÞÞ¼U’’1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞdc*ðtÞ þ
1
2
U’’’1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞdc*; c* t (A.23)then,
dc*ðtÞ
c*ðtÞ ¼  rðsÞ
U’1ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
c*ðtÞU’’1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
dt U
’’’
1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
2c*ðtÞU’’1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
dc*; c* t  ϑθðsÞ U
’
1ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
c*ðtÞU’’1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
d bW ðsÞ (A.24)
We denote
σc  σðlnðc*ðtÞÞÞ¼  U
’
1ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
c*ðtÞU’’1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
ϑθ; (A.25)
and then substitute ϑθ into Eq (A.21), we have
bM þ Φffiffiffiffi
dt
p ϕ	MðtÞ>σ r<  c*ðtÞU’’1 ðt; c*ðtÞÞσcU’1ðt; c*ðtÞÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σMMðtÞ þ ~σMMðtÞ
p
(A.26)
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.References
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